Moral Theology

Summary

1 Lessons from History

2 Human Ethics or Religious Morality?

3 A Dual Approach in Current Morality

4 The Urgency of a Scientific Approach

5 The Pursuit of Greater Good

6 Conscience as a Central Theme

7 Sin and Guilt

8 Collective Sin

9 Bibliographical References

1 Lessons from History

There is no doubt that moral theology has suffered a significant devaluation in our contemporary world. Many people, educated in a Christian environment, have ceased to believe in the ethical teachings received. For a long time, however, such ethical teachings had a strong influence among believers and guided concrete life. The Church’s power to interpret and apply these ethical teachings to different situations was considered an explicit expression of God’s will. The promise of the Spirit gave it a firm guarantee against error in its teachings. The faithful had no alternatives but obedience and submission.

Even though the study of moral theology has been promoted in good universities, under the teaching of great theologians, it is also true that such discipline never lost its main interest throughout history, which was to help confessors in the ministry of reconciliation, which was its center. The priest expressed God’s forgiveness and mercy; however, as a judge, it was also necessary for him to have exact knowledge of the seriousness and importance of the committed act. Most moral texts, until recently, had become true “sin meters,” measuring, with precision and imagination, all possibilities (casuistry).

This primary orientation did not prevent, however, many discussions that occurred throughout history on topics related to certain ethical issues. Just remember, for example, the different ways of harmonizing the demands of the law with the decisions of conscience. The so-called moral systems did not refer, as it may seem, to the great foundations of morality, but to the different proportions defended between legal obligation and the freedom of each person to determine their choice in different circumstances. Although past claims may seem outdated today, they are undoubtedly still influential enough to avoid or induce a more or less rigorous view (rigorism).

The same happened with the basic core of morality. That is, concerning those fundamental limits that could never be exceeded (natural law). Its existence has been evoked on many occasions to impose certain behaviors. What belongs to this scope has greater consistency; however, the risk of expanding its borders has been, nevertheless, a historical reality. The question of knowing how far its demands go remains a less evident point. Especially when it is perceived that among classical authors there is no consensus or hegemony regarding the explanation.

To avoid a pluralism that could be dangerous for the ecclesial community, the Church found very important support in its magisterium. The classic difference between ethics and morality found its starting point here. Morality had its origin in the word of God which the Church, with the special help of the Spirit, has to interpret and impose with its authority, according to various historical and personal situations. In turn, ethics was based on the demands of reason, which did not offer greater security, being subject to human errors. It was even indicated that its own conclusions should be subordinated to the content of morality. Philosophy was relegated for a long time to being no more than a simple aid to faith. Not in vain, it came to be considered as a slave of theology. There was no other option but obedience and submission, as remorse and the threat of condemnation constituted an extraordinarily effective source.

Therefore, the approach of a new problem inevitably arises. As rational beings, we must act with an inner conviction that justifies the behavior we adopt. A rational explanation effort so that our resulting behavior is sensible and understandable. But as believers, we cannot eliminate our transcendent dimension, which makes us find in God the fundamental explanation of our life. Listening and docility to his word are also part of our ethical horizon.

2 Human Ethics or Religious Morality?

The methodological problem that emerges is knowing what our starting point should be. Whether we start from reason to build a human, reasonable, valid, and universal ethics for all, or whether it is revelation that must guarantee us, as believers, the firmness and full security of our conduct. We must avoid extremist opinions, both of those who, on the one hand, deny the benchmark of faith in defense of full human autonomy, and, on the other hand, the view of those who wish to resort only to the literal word of the Scriptures. Secular ethics would be a good representative of the first option. It proclaims and defends the human consistency of rules and obligations, without using external justifications. In divinity was found the answer to the ignorance that prevented discovering a rational foundation. The hypothesis of a God who reveals himself or a church that teaches with authority has moved to the museum of history. Scientific progress certified its definitive death.

The Protestant response, on the contrary, defends an antagonistic radicalism. For the Christian, there is no other option than that of a purely religious ethics. One can only act honestly when one listens to the word and allows oneself to be directed by the message of revelation. Any other attempt to guide life through human values leads to complete failure, as there is no capacity in the human being to discover good from himself. No moralist can usurp God’s throne to determine what is good and what is unacceptable, as if possessing a competence that belongs only to God. Then, a manifest contradiction arises between ethical imperatives and religious demands. In the religious horizon, the only existing ethical category is that of the absurd, like Abraham’s intriguing posture, who, in order to obey God, is willing to sacrifice his own son.

I do not intend to explain now the nuances existing in both positions. I just want to emphasize that, within Catholicism, an intermediate position has always been defended. Human and religious dimensions are not two mutually exclusive or contradictory realities. Between faith and reason, there is a complementary harmony, without either losing its value and usefulness. An ethics is sought that is profoundly religious, supernatural, and transcendent, but that does not cease to be, at the same time, truly human, rational, and understandable.

3 A Dual Approach in Current Morality

Among Catholic authors, the similarity of thought on this basic assumption reaches its unanimity. However, the insistence and emphasis placed on each of them lead to a dual approach that raises controversies within the ecclesial community. It is a matter of inclination either to an autonomous ethics, which emphasizes more the rationality of ethical contents, or to a morality of faith, which places more emphasis on the data of revelation. The problem is not just a speculative question, but it should concern us because of its pastoral implications.

In summary, we could say that autonomous ethics has greater confidence in the capacity of human reason, despite its limits and restrictions. It seeks to make ethical values understandable in a secular and adult world, which demands rational explanation for its own conviction. The man of faith knows that this capacity was given to him as a gift from God (autonomy theonomous), however, without destroying its justification or human autonomy. The morality of faith manifests certain reservations about this approach, believing that it is quite naive and optimistic, as without the help of revelation we would fall into many errors. It must be said that John Paul II was an enthusiastic defender of the primacy and necessity of faith over any attempt at a purely rational foundation of morality.

The essential question is whether morality is possible without the help of faith if it does not provide us with ethical contents impossible to discover without the help of revelation. In other words, it consists of knowing whether the values that humanize us can or cannot be discovered without the help of the supernatural. From the decision taken in the face of this alternative, the flourishing of a specifically Christian morality can be foreseen, whose contents cannot be known from another perspective. Or, on the other hand, it is recognized that, even without taking into account the believer’s supernatural dimension, we can find a common platform, a heritage of all human beings.

The inevitable divergences are not only based on these different points of view. Every ethical value is an appeal that we feel to realize ourselves as persons. We are born unfinished, and it is not possible to achieve this goal (that of humanization[1]) by letting ourselves be carried away by the primary impulses we experience. The human being, through the renunciations and compensations he experiences in his education, has the task of discovering what configuration he wishes to give to all the elements found in his nature. Ethics is nothing more than the lifestyle that each person decides to give to their existence.

It is interesting to note that Saint Thomas, when explaining what constitutes an offense to God, does so from a profoundly humanistic perspective: “God is not offended by us, except inasmuch as we act against our own good” (Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 122).

4 The Urgency of a Scientific Approach

I mean that everything morally considered unacceptable or, from a religious point of view, classified as sin, is also not, from a human point of view, the best way to realize oneself as a person.

All this means that authentic morality is not possible without being based on scientific foundations, otherwise, we would suppose the defense of a morality without foundation. The difficulty lies in the fact that science does not always have unanimous conclusions that allow the evaluation of behavior. The field of bioethics is a clear example of this difficulty. It is also worth noting that, with the progress and new discoveries of science, the solutions previously taken must be reconsidered or reinterpreted differently to integrate the new possibilities.

In this context, there is a danger that morality becomes an obstacle to progress by immediately condemning any new possibility that does not fully conform to previous norms and teachings. The conflict then arises between fidelity to a value, as presented in tradition, and fidelity to a new truth that can enrich the previous perspective. Culture itself, which develops over time, offers different perspectives that allow us to value any reality. Even within the same cultural sphere, as is the case of the Church, significant changes have occurred that affect the formulation of concrete ethics. For centuries, the phenomenon of slavery was naturally accepted; and hardly anyone was scandalized by the fact that heretics were burned at the stake.

Finally, there is today a dual way of applying some ethical values to reality. Not everything presented as a valid and acceptable principle in theory can be applied in concrete situations. Evident and acceptable values such as not lying, respecting life, paying each one according to their merit, etc., must be analyzed to verify if it is worth fulfilling them in the possible eventuality that their execution provokes a greater evil. The same traditional morality affirms that when an action implies good and negative consequences, in the case of perplexity, everyone must choose the evil that seems lesser. The so-called principle of double effect, the law of graduality, the distinction between formal and material cooperation, and the virtue of equity indicate that an action cannot be judged until it is specifically considered how it is concretely carried out.

5 The Pursuit of a Greater Good

We must discover, therefore, what is the highest value that we need to seek and place above everything else. Or whether, in order to avoid worse negative consequences, we must opt for the elimination of some good. This concrete morality is sought today through a dual path, through deontological argumentation, or through teleological reasoning. The difference between the two positions can be summarized as follows. A normative theory will be deontological when the morality of a given behavior is deduced through the analysis of its nature, without giving any importance to the consequences or negative effects that may result from such behavior (deontology). A normative theory in the teleological dimension, on the other hand, even though it also considers the nature of the action, does not dare to value it without first considering the consequences it may produce (teleology).

It does not seem to me that this latter perspective, to which most current moralists lean, is against the fundamental teachings of the Church, although official doctrine criticizes many of its formulations. Nor do I think that with this approach we are entering a morality of pure efficiency or immediate benefits. Nor is the existence of so-called intrinsically sinful actions denied when there is no reason or motive that could justify their non-observance. However, it is true that they do not always coincide in the same valuation.

6 Conscience as a Central Theme

From its understanding as the nucleus secretissimus atque sacrarium hominis, in quo solus est cum Deo (Saint Augustine), the Second Vatican Council defines the doctrine of conscience: “Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged. Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, whose voice echoes in his depths. By conscience, in a wonderful way, that law is made known which is fulfilled in the love of God and of one’s neighbor” (Gaudium et spes, n. 16).

Called to communion with God, the human being is in continuous listening to his Word and keeps it in his heart (Jer 17,1; 31,31-34; Ez 14,1-5; 36,26), whose only inhabitant is God (Jer 11,20). The Gospel of Jesus, meek and humble of heart (Mt 11,28-30), germinates in the innermost part of the person (Mt 13,19). From this core spring human words, attitudes, and behaviors (Mk 7,18-23). The apostle Paul interprets the Semitic tradition of the heart and translates it into the Greek notion of conscience (syneidesis) as an intimate expression of the new creature and his existence in Christ (Hb 9,12).

The key to understanding Christian morality is discernment (dokimázein): the ability to make, in a given situation, the moral decision according to the Gospel and with knowledge of the implications of salvation history. Discernment points to the pneumatological character of conscience. The primary content of Christian discernment is the will of God in Jesus Christ (Rom 12,2; Eph 5,17). Discernment is the very exercise of conscience; it is the adult moral conscience in action (Hb 5,14). The Church presents itself as a community of discernment: “that you may discern what is best or what is good, what is more important or what most pleases God” (Rom 2,18; 12,2; Phil 1,10; Eph 5,10). This perspective is the foundation of the sensus fidelium. “The laity must have an ever-clearer consciousness not only of belonging to the Church but of being the Church” (Catechism of the Catholic Church n. 899). Every baptized person has the right, by virtue of their knowledge, competence, and recognition, to express to the ecclesial community their opinion on what pertains to the good of the Church.

Freedom of conscience has the final word regarding the concrete moral prescriptions of the Church. Each faithful, letting themselves be questioned by their conscience, by the Word of God, and by Tradition, is called to make the ethical choice responsibly. No one can be forced to act against their own conscience, not even in matters of religion (Code of Canon Law, 748, 2): “Conscience is the first of all vicars of Christ” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1778 – quote from Cardinal Newman). Personal decision, therefore, acquires extraordinary prominence (moral decision). Only one’s own (conscience) has the last and definitive word for the morality of our actions, but without forgetting the validity and obligatoriness of ethical norms (moral norm).

It can be said that, for the legalist, the rule always retains its validity as the safest way to avoid errors. The antinomian, on the contrary, nullifies its validity in order to follow the dictates of their personal decision (situational ethics). The mature person, however, accepts, on the one hand, the obligatoriness of ethical demands but also knows how to relativize them when faced with other important values, provided that such actions are not considered intrinsically sinful, as we have already said.

This personalistic view of conscience harmoniously integrates the dialectic between the dual objective and subjective dimensions of morality without falling into the extremes of legalistic morality or subjectivist ethics. A pedagogy of morality should consist of awakening free and responsible consciences, always guided by the call or appeal to a greater good.

7 Sin and Guilt

As has happened with other issues, the image of sin has undergone a profound change in our society. The Church itself, in some of its documents, has expressed its concern. Here too, there are many factors that caused this situation, as pointed out by Pope John Paul II in the Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and Penance. I briefly cite three aspects that I consider important.

The first, undoubtedly, is the loss of the supernatural vision. The terrible thing about an accident does not lie in the fact that the car was destroyed, but in the life lost among its wreckage. Sin is not simply breaking a law or not fulfilling an obligation, but it implies the rupture of a friendship with the God who saves us. When this transcendent dimension fades, as happens in our secularized societies, the image of sin also disappears.

Many people do not want to acknowledge their own guilt, as if it were a decision that springs from it. Error and mistake are part of our heritage, as an inevitable consequence of our finitude. The fault, however, is not due to the freedom of the one who acts thus, but it constitutes a failure for which no one can feel responsible. It is an event that leaves us upset and hurt, that moves us, as it affects the most intimate fibers of the personality, but on the human being, even if he commits evil, no accusatory condemnation can be cast. No one chooses something against himself, and therefore, when rejecting God or refusing an ethical value, it is because he found another attraction for which he feels inevitably seduced without another possibility of choice.

Although it may seem strange, evident proof of our freedom is not easy. The one who insists on denying it will see, behind each choice, a world of certain experiences, pressures, memories, interests, expectations, etc., which tilt the balance to one side in an inevitable way. The hypothesis of its existence, however, is not an anti-scientific fact. The multiple mechanisms that threaten it do not necessarily destroy the basic capacity of self-determination. However, we should not defend it with excessive naivety. There are many factors that condition it, although they do not eliminate it. It is possible that, at times, we want and cannot, but more frequently, it is the situation in which we can and do not want. Freedom is also an achievement that each person must realize with their effort.

It is logical that the person who did not want to respond to the call of a value that dehumanizes him, or as a believer finds himself closed to friendship with God, experiences some discomfort internally. The failure of a human or religious project, although not absolute and definitive, must produce certain internal reactions that do not leave us calm and immutable, as if nothing had happened. Guilt, like pain or fever in biological mechanisms, makes us feel the malfunction of the person and the desire for effective healing.

This feeling of guilt could be caused by different factors. A sense of anguish for fear of loss or fear of punishment. What hurts is not the evil done, but the bad consequences resulting from it. On other occasions, it is the wound caused by one’s own narcissism. It is a fact that destroys the ideal Self, which humiliates and corrodes, with remorse becoming a constant companion. When, in its deepest nature, it is rooted in the shame of having attacked my own good, caused harm to others, and above all, broken my friendship with God.

8 Collective Sin

The concept of sin has always been analyzed from a too individualistic perspective. The important thing was not to feel guilty about individual performance. If, despite one’s honesty, sin still exists, such a situation will then be the product of other people collaborating with the existing evil. Such an approach becomes completely incomprehensible in our current culture, in which the political dimension has extraordinary relevance.

The Second Vatican Council, in the Constitution on the Church in the modern world, had already clearly exposed this approach: “The deep and rapid transformation of life urgently requires that no one, out of indifference to reality or pure inertia, conform to a merely individualistic ethics” (n1 30). Collective sin is an evident reality, as pointed out by the Latin American bishops in the assemblies of Medellín and Puebla.

The fundamental reflection could be focused on this basic question: what should be the ethical and Christian attitude of the person aware of their commitment, in the face of injustices and social sins that do not depend on them and that they will not be able to eliminate?

Eduardo Lopez Azpitarte, SJ – Facultad Teologica de Granada, Spain. Original text in Spanish. Translation: José Sebastião Gonçalves

9 Bibliographical References

Aa.Vv. Que todo sea para edificación (1 Cor, 14,25). Leer el magisterio y la tradición. Sal Terrae, v.97, p.781-879. 2009.

BRACKLEY, D. Tendencias actuales de la Teología moral en América Latina. Revista Latinoamericana de Teología, v.19, p.95-120. 2002.

BARCELÓ, Eduardo Bonnín. Pecado social y estructuras de pecado en la Teología latinoamericana. Efemérides Mexicana, v.23, p.41-9. 2005.

DEMMER, Klaus. Introduction to moral theology. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Loyola, 2007.

GUARDINI, Romano. La coscienza. 4th ed. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1977.

JOSAPHAT, C. Todos serán teodidatas (Jo 6,45): docilidad al espíritu, autenticidad de la conciencia. Perspectiva Teológica, v.44, p.373-98. 2012.

JUNGES, José Roque. Evento Cristo y acción humana: temas fundamentales de ética teológica. São Leopoldo: UNISINOS, 2001.

LÓPEZ AZPITARTE, E. Towards a new vision of Christian ethics. Santander: Sal Terrae, 2003.

______. Challenges for the renewal of Catholic morality. Revista Iberoamericana de Teología, v.4, p.65-93. 2008.

______. Ethical conflicts and the magisterium of the Church. Perspectiva Teológica, v.44, p.353-72. 2012.

______. Foundation of Christian ethics. São Paulo: Paulus, 1995.

LONERGAN, Bernard J. F. The formation of conscience. Brescia: La Scuola, 2010.

MARTÍNEZ, J. L.; CAMAÑO, J. M. Fundamental Morality. Theological bases for ethical discernment. Santander: Sal Terrae, 2014.

MIER, S. Challenges and hopes for moral theology from Latin America. Revista Iberoamericana de Teología, n.4, p.85-98. 2007.

MUÑOZ, J. Contributions of liberation theology to the reflection on the experience of sin. Theologica Xaveriana, n.52 p.277-90. 2002.

SESBOÜE, B. El magisterio a examen. Authority, truth, and magisterium in the Church. Bilbao: Mensajero, 2004.

______. Magisterium and conscience. Perspectiva Teológica, n.44, p.399-413. 2012.

THEVENOT, Xavier. Counting on God: studies in moral theology. São Paulo: Loyola, 2008.

TRIGO, T. The debate on the specificity of Christian morality. Pamplona: Eunsa, 2003.

VALADIER, Paul. Elogio de la conciencia. São Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2000.

______. The Christian condition: in the world without being of the world. Santander: Sal Terrae, 2006.

VIDAL, M. Orientaciones éticas para tiempos inciertos. Bilbao: Desclée De Brouwer, 2007.

______. Nueva Nueva Moral Fundamental. The theological home of ethics. Madrid: Perpetuo Socorro, 2014. (Trad. port: Nova moral fundamental: the theological home of ethics. São Paulo: Paulinas/Santuário, 2003.)

VITALI, D. Universitas fidelium in credendo falli nequit (LG 12). The ‘sensus fidelium’ at the Second Vatican Council. Gregorianum, v.86, p.607-28. 2005.

ZUCCARO, Cataldo. Christology and morality: history, interpretation, perspectives. São Paulo: Ave Maria, 2007.

[1] Translator’s elucidation.